This article addresses the implications of political executives losing control over corruption investigations of senior officeholders following the creation of anticorruption mechanisms (e.g., commissions, special prosecutors, independent counsels, investigating judges). When investigations hit close to home, the ensuing political falloutmakes political executives eager to look for ways to derail such investigations, especially when investigators proceed with and uncharted mandate. Against this background, two hypotheses are investigates: (i) the striking outcome of this process is a concerted move by targeted political executives to undermine the credibility of anticorruption mechanisms and, when deemed necessary, to terminate their operation, and (ii) the extent to which the prosecutors are successful depends on both intstitutions and media accessibility: the more centralized and fused political power is, and lthe less media accessible the government is, the harder it will be to carry out an investigation. These hypotheses are strongly supported by a comparative analysis of five antycorruption mechanisms in the United States, the Soviet Union, Italy, and Australia.
Feeling the Heat? Anticorruption Mechanisms in Comparative Perspective – Maor – 2003 – Governance – Wiley Online Library